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A border was once defined as the line 
separating two groups, each of which believes 
that civilization ends at that line. Somehow 
that reminds me of the current state of U.S.-
European economic relations. It is fascinating 
to participate, as I recently have, in a discus-
sion on the other side of the Atlantic on the role 
of the United States in the international econ-
omy. It is so different from the discussion of 
the same subject on this side of the ocean. I 
would like to share with you some of the 
insights that I obtained. 
View One: The Angelic U.S. 
As you might suspect, we Americans tend to 
see our nation as the embodiment of fairness 
and idealism in an otherwise nasty and selfish 
world. In that view-which I label the angelic 
U.S.-our strong recovery is the engine that is 
pulling Europe and the rest of the world out 
of recession. Our triple-digit (in billions) trade 
deficit reflects the tremendous market poten-
tial which, in our naivete, we are permitting 
other countries to take excessive advantage of. 
In this angelic view of the U.S., Western 
Europe talks about government aid to develop-
ing nations, while the United States acts-
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providing, via open trade, opportunities for 
these nations to earn the foreign exchange they 
so badly need. America invests a growing 
percentage of its national wealth in the nuclear 
umbrella that protects the entire free world. 
At the same time, other nations increase invest-
ment in their own productive capacity, which 
enables them to compete with aging American 
industry. And, of course, the angelic view main-
tains that the United States is an island of free 
trade in a world of subsidy and protectionism. 
View Two: The U.S. As Devil 
That is not quite the picture that I get on the 
other side of the Atlantic. There, the United 
States emerges more in the role of, shall I say 
to provide a vivid contrast, the devil. Our 
friends overseas remind us of the evils arising 
from our loose and irresponsible fiscal policy, 
how those 200 billion dollar budget deficits 
have pushed up interest rates, and how the 
resultant superstrong dollar is bedeviling the 
economies of every other nation. All this sup-
posedly forces our European friends to a 
painful action; in order to limit the outflow.of 
capital to the United States, they must mam-
tain high interest rates in the face of high 
unemployment, all at the expense of their own 
social needs. 
In this second or devilish incarnation, rather 
than being a firm apostle of free trade, the 
United States is seen as the hypocritical nation 
that maintains a firm "Buy-American" policy 
while berating the trade barriers erected by 
other governments. While focusing on its 
massive trade deficit with Japan, the U.S. con-
veniently overlooks the large trade surplus it 
ran with the European community over the 
past decade (although not in the most recent 
past). 
Also, the United States, it is recalled, tried 
to force an embargo of the Soviet pipeline 
while selling the Russians our surplus grain. 
Speaking of the Russians, I am told that the 
Americans-especially Reagan Administration 
spokesmen-delight in irritating the Soviet 
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Union. The Americans, in that view, com•en-
ientlv overlook Western Europe's proximitv 
and ;ur own great distance from what Ronal~\ 
Reagan calls the "evil empire." 
View Three: A Composite Picture 
readily plead guilty, of course, to con-
siderable exaggeration in each of the two views 
I have just presented. Yet there is a strong fac-
tual, albeit incomplete, basis for each of the 
two views. Clearly, the attitudes on the two 
sides of the Atlantic are very different. Still. the 
two views are held tenaciously, and often by 
people with considerable knowledge and 
experience. 
The nature of the problem was illustrated to 
me recently when I debated the subject of 
trade deficits with an executive of one of our 
own large manufacturing companies. He viv-
idly demonstrated the "flood" of imports into 
the United States with the help of an unusual 
set of props. He had brought with him items 
from his own home which were imported from 
overseas. It was an extensive collection of 
foreign products which had successfully 
penetrated our domestic market. 
My response, I must candidly report, did not 
go over nearly as well. I lamely referred to all 
the American exports that were probabl) in the 
homes of his counterparts in London, Paris, 
Rome, and Frankfurt. But the audience had 
great difficulty in visualizing my point in the 
absence of physical examples that they could 
see, smell, and touch. That, of course, is the 
difficulty in developing an objective view of 
these complicated matters. We must go beyond 
the factors that we know from our own 
experiences. 
But let us try to develop a more balanced 
view of the international role of the American 
economy. Such a balanced view will show that 
the United States is neither angel nor devil. but 
that it is-I say candidly-part of each. To be 
sure, I am reminded of the cynical comment, 
that if you stand in the middle of the road, as 
I am trying to do, you are most likely to be hit 
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by the passing traffic. But nevertheless, let us 
persevere. 
Fundamental Changes in the U.S. Economy 
In their preoccupation with budget deficits, 
many observers, both at home and abroad, 
have overlooked fundamental changes that 
have been occurring in the U.S. economic 
environment. Many of these developments have 
an impact in Western Europe and other parts 
of the world. At any rate, this seems an oppor-
tune time to review these changes as Ronald 
Reagan-the architect of many of them-nears 
his second term. 
The Merger Movement 
For example, since January 1981. there has 
been a new and more positive governmental 
attitude toward mergers between large cor-
porations. Those who favor this development 
say that it is a more modern and enlightened 
government position. Those who do not share 
this positive view label the government's will-
ingness to go along with these combinations 
as permissive. The important point is that, dur-
ing the past four years, there has been an un-
precedented wave of mergers in the United 
States which did not require any special laws 
from Congress. 
The intematio1wl implicatio11 of the 
stepped-up merger move me 11 t may 110t 
be \Velcomed overseas \Vith great 
enthusiasm. But this is a far more 
benign response to import competitio11 
than traditional protectio11ist measures. 
Rather, the President appointed a new 
Attorney General. a new Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission, and a new head of 
the antitrust division. This favorable attitude 
on the part of the antitrust agencies toward 
large mergers will, to a substantial degree, con-
tinue beyond the Reagan Administration. I say 
that because it is becoming clear that U.S. com-
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panies increasingly compete in global markets 
and domestic antitrust enforcement inevitably 
has to respond to economic reality. 
The international implication of this 
stepped-up merger movement may not be 
welcomed overseas with great enthusiasm. The 
long-term result could very well be enhanced 
competitiveness on the part of many American 
companies. But I tell them that this is a far 
more benign response to import competition 
than tradi tiona! protectionist measures. 
Labor-Management Relations 
Another key area of the American economy 
that has been ignored because of the pre-
occupation with budget deficits is labor-
management relations. One of the most impor-
tant labor events in the United States in the 
past decade was the President's breaking the 
illegal strike by the air traffic controllers. 
Firing the controllers was a decisive move that 
signaled a fundamental turn in American 
labor-management relations. 
I believe it was the main reason that the 
postal unions did not seriously consider going 
on strike. But the repercussions of the Pres-
ident's action extended to the private sector as 
well. There was a strong and clear signal that 
the government would no longer get involved 
in disputes between companies and their 
unions-and certainly not on the side of the 
unions. In many past administrations, the 
federal government put pressure on manage-
ment to settle promptly with unions. The result 
was escalating wage settlements. Our high-cost 
steel industry is a cogent example of the 
dangers of such past government intervention. 
Since 1981, we have seen a remarkable 
decline in union demands. The slower rise 
of labor costs, of course, has helped reduce 
inflationary pressures. It has also enhanced 
productivity and, hence, increased the com-
petitiveness of American industry. Moreover, 
lower inflation rates have also reduced the 
ratcheting effects of cost of living adjustments 
on American wage rates. Thus, we see impor-
tant feedback effects at work here, the 
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economic adjustment mechanism operating at 
its best. 
International competition has also begun to 
exert profound effects on U.S. wages, especially 
in autos and steel. Currently, both labor and 
management in these and other import-
threatened industries find it in their mutual 
interest to seek short-term relief through 
quotas, euphemistically called voluntary 
export restraints. They are becoming increas-
ingly aware, however, of the need to moderate 
wage increases and foster productivity growth 
in order to improve the long-term health of 
their industries-and thus respond construc-
tively to the pressures of worldwide 
competition. 
Uneven Trade Policies 
Of course, most of our trading partners are 
not very sympathetic with our efforts to pro-
tect American industry. The track record of the 
Reagan Administration in this area is, at best, 
uneven. The Administration said "no" to pleas 
to extend quotas on non-rubber footwear but 
it has supported limits on automobile imports 
as well as efforts to restrict textile imports. 
It would help to clear the air in international 
trade discussions if the United States were to 
acknowledge that all of our actions are not on 
the side of the angels. We have created many 
obstacles to inhibit imports into the United 
States. 
Although our average tariff rates are low, 
high tariffs are levied on selective items. Tariffs 
on textiles average 20 percent. "Buy American" 
statutes give preference to domestic producers 
in government procurement. The Jones Act 
prohibits foreign ships from engaging in com-
merce between American ports. This law, of 
course, effectively bars all competition in U.S. 
domestic mar-ine transport. 
The recent effort to further protect the 
domestic steel industry furnishes another 
example of the way in which U.S. trade policy 
produces self-inflicted wounds. Recently, 
Arthur Denzau at our Center for the Study of 
American Business analyzed the effects of steel 
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quotas on America's steel-using industry; he 
points out the fallacy of thinking that these 
measures "save" jobs. Dr. Denzau estimates 
that the 26,000 jobs saved in the steel industry 
would reduce employment in steel-using sec-
tors, which are also subject to global competi-
tion, by 93,000 jobs-for a net loss of 67,000 
jobs. 
All irz all, it would help if the 
Urzited States were to reduce its 
self-righteousness in dealing with 
trade matters, arzd also if other nations 
vvould take our pleas for open trade 
nwre seriously. 
Although the United States is more protec-
tionist than it likes to admit, it is useful to 
point out to other countries the great extent to 
which our trade restrictions ar-e a two-edged 
sword. Embargoes on grain and soybeans cur-
tailed our exports and increased our trade 
deficit. So do restraints on high-tech trade. All 
in all, it would help if the United States were 
to reduce its self-righteousness in dealing with 
trade matters, and also if other nations would 
take our pleas for open trade more seriously. 
As I see it, the United States' role in world trade 
is ambivalent-neither angel nor devil. 
Impact of Triple Digit Deficits 
In developing a more evenhanded approach 
to assessing the United States in the world 
economy, we should remind ourselves that 
those truly outrageous budget deficits have 
helped to generate a strong recovery in the 
American economy. That has led simulta-
neously to important desirable results in the 
international economy-such as providing a 
growing market for Western Europe and the 
developing countries-and many undesirable 
results as well-high interest rates, apprecia-
tion of the dollar, and extraordinary inflows of 
capital into the U.S. 
There are two derivative notions that we can 
develop from this general point. One is that the 
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pluses and the minuses go together. In the 
absence of the huge budget deficits and their 
ramifications, I doubt that those substantial 
trade deficits would have developed. The sec-
ond point is that U.S. policies and practices are 
not the sole source of the difficulties facing 
other nations. 
For example, the fall in the value of the franc 
that followed the 1981 election victory of 
M. Mitterand surely did not result from any 
U.S. action. Rather, such adverse consequences 
resulted from the financial markets' correct 
anticipation of the economically troublesome 
policies that Mitterand would introduce in his 
first year in office. 
I readily agree that we would all be better 
off if our budget deficits were half their size. 
And I also would be happier if I would awake 
tomorrow young and handsome. I assign equal 
probabilities to the two cases. Having urged, 
from the outset, policies that would have 
reduced those deficits, I do not now have to 
apologize for them. Rather, I merely try to 
realistically acknowledge their likely contin-
uation and explain their varied impacts. 
Along these lines, I reminded our European 
friends that the deficits are not viewed in the 
United States as a means of exporting our 
domestic difficulties. Rather, the U.S. economy 
itself suffers from them in many ways. Thus, 
I called their attention to the fact that the 
interest-sensitive sectors of our domestic 
economy have suffered from the financial 
effects of massive Treasury borrowing. Impor-
tant examples include housing, agriculture, 
and durable goods production-in what some 
now call the "rust belt." 
Thus, there are compelling domestic reasons 
for reducing the deficits. The delay is not due 
to a lack of recognition of the problem but to 
insufficient public support for the politically 
painful steps which would reduce the deficit 
financing. 
Future Changes in the Political Environment 
What about the next four years? Despite the 
current rhetoric, I expect few domestic in-
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1t1atives by the White House. Budget cuts 
always loom larger in the December leaks than 
in the January budget. The President is sat-
isfied that his economic program is working. 
Taxes have been cut, inflation is lower than 
almost anyone anticipated, and production, 
sales, and employment are all continuing to 
rise. As he would put it, "What more do they 
want?" 
Thus, in his second term, the President's 
attention can and probably will shift, as it 
already has in part, to foreign policy matters. 
The rapid arms buildup will be maintained. 
Relationships with the Russians will continue 
to be difficult, but that area will also get 
greater attention. 
In a second term, a President starts think-
ing about how he will go down in the history 
books. Trimming government spending may be 
an important issue today, but it is not likely to 
create a memorable Presidency. However, if 
President Reagan succeeds in persuading the 
Russians that they cannot keep up with the 
American Joneses (or rather Weinberger), 
perhaps they will then agree to arms reduc-
tion. Whether you believe that eventuality to 
be likely or not, it is important to understand 
that the President hopes that such a result will 
occur. If he can achieve substantial and mutual 
arms reduction, Ronald Reagan will deserve an 
important place in history. 
Dealing with Deficits 
As for those deficits, the proposed constitu-
tional amendment to require an annually 
balanced federal budget is looked upon by the 
White House as the major response. In addi-
tion, the President's tentative approval of a 
freeze on civilian spending, except social 
security, raises some new hope. Given the 
short-term difficulties of cutting specific 
budgets, the constitutional approach is 
regarded as the only satisfactory long-term 
solution to the fiscal problem facing the 
nation. But, because of the length of time it 
would take before such an amendment would 
be in force, adopting that approach would 
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necessitate little action on the budget deficit 
during the next four years. A cynic might note 
that the attractiveness of the balanced budget 
amendment is that the tough decisions can be 
postponed until Ronald Reagan's successot· 
takes office. 
Spending cuts should precede tax 
changes. We need a national debate on 
specific programs within each of the 
thirteen major spending areas. 
I believe that the budget deserves the same 
attention as is being given to tax refom1, and 
that action on spending cuts should precede 
tax changes. We need a national debate on 
specific programs within each of the thirteen 
major spending areas. We could start by 
making Dave Stockman's budget proposals as 
open to the public as the recent Treasury 
Department tax report. 
Tax Reform 
We will hear a great deal about tax reform 
in 1985. President Reagan has vowed not to 
raise income tax rates. That language provides 
considerable flexibility. Most likely, the second 
Reagan Administration will try to move toward 
a flatter income tax structure. That means 
broader brackets and lower rates. However, in 
order to maintain the total flow of revenue to 
the federal government, it becomes essential 
to broaden the tax base. 
In spite of a good deal of 
huffing and puffing about budget cuts 
and tax reforms the budget deficit will 
not come tumbling down. American 
fiscal policy will persist in bedeviling 
other 1Wtio11s' economies. 
The basic choice Congress will face in 
broadening the tax base will be between 
politically unpopular moves that reduce con-
sumption and economically undesirable 
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changes that reduce investment. Under those 
circumstances, the prospects for raising the 
total level of federal revenue via tax reform is 
surely limited. In short, in spite of a good deal 
of huffing and puffing about budget cuts and 
tax reforms, the budget deficit will not come 
tumbling down. Thus, in the eyes of the rest 
of the world-both Westem economies whose 
capital flows will continue to be attracted to 
the U.S. by high interest rates, and debtor na-
tions whose interest payments will continue to 
strain their economies-American fiscal 
policy will persist in bedeviling their 
economies. 
Trade Policy 
. If the Administration's efforts to negotiate 
Import restraints on steel fail, we will have an 
early test of Ronald Reagan's commitment to 
free trade. Benefits of protectionism are con-
centrated by industry and geography while the 
costs are widely disbursed. And it is this 
political reality that legislators-who are 
perpetually running for reelection-must 
confront. 
While the rest of the world may still view 
U.S. trade policies as hypocritical, the 
possibilities for greatly increased protec-
tionism are reduced as a result of the 
November Presidential election. Domestic con-
tent legislation for autos is far less likely to be 
brought up as it would have been if Mr. Man-
dale had won. Nor are the calls for an in-
dustrial policy likely to attract as much 
support. 
Our trading partners should be "relatively" 
pleased-it could have been worse. Realis-
tically, they should also acknowledge that 
many of their policies, affecting both basic 
industry and agriculture, are far more bla-
tantly protectionist. 
Final Thoughts 
To sum up very briefly, each of the major 
Western nations faces serious economic prob-
lems of primarily domestic origin. If each 
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attempts to deal with them-to get its own 
house in order-we will have a healthier inter-
national economic and financial system. Of 
course, it is always easier to focus on the ac-
tions of foreign devils. But the inevitable pro-
tectionist and othet- interventionist responses 
only exacerbate the underlying problems. 
When I am on this side of the Atlantic Ocean, 
I invariably find myself opposing those who 
blame forces overseas for domestic difficulties. 
Perhaps it is merely an old habit, but I enjoyed 
taking that position in Western Europe 
recently, when I was one of those foreign 
devils. 
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